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NEGLIGENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY
IN SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS UNDER § 17(a) OF THE SECURITIES ACT
OF 1933
SEC v. Coven
Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits individuals
from employing "any device, scheme or artifice to defraud" or en-
gaging in "any transaction, practice or course of business which...
would operate as a fraud or deceit" in the offer or sale of securities.,
Designed to protect the investing public, 2 section 17(a) may be en-
forced through suits brought by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) for injunctive relief' as well as through private ac-
'15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). The statute provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
2 See SEC v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir. 1966). Section 17(a) was the forerun-
ner of Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978), which was promulgated pursuant to § 10(b)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). See 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION 1426-27 (2d
ed. 1961); Note, Securities Regulation-Civil Liability for Failure to Disclose the Fraud of a
Third Person, 35 U. Mo.-KAN. CrrY L. Rav. 320, 323 (1967). Unlike Rule 10b-5, which prohib-
its fraud in the purchase or sale of securities, the provisions of § 17(a) cover only fraudulent
sales. Because of the limitations inherent in § 17(a), the SEC has relied primarily on Rule
lob-5 as an enforcement tool. See SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453; 465 (1960). Since
some courts have concluded that the scienter requirement established in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), see note 7 infra, must logically be applied to Commission
actions for injunctive relief under § 10(b), the SEC may be expected to place more reliance
on § 17(a) in future enforcement proceedings. See generally SEC General Counsel's Memo-
randum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, reprinted in Sac. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No.
354, at F-1 (May 26, 1976).
Section 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (1976), which grants the SEC author-
ity to commence an action to enjoin violations of any of the provisions of the Act, provides
in pertinent part:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a viola-
tion of the provisions of this subchapter, or of any rule or regulation prescribed
under authority thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district court
... . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or
temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond. ...
The Commission also has the power to seek injunctive relief under analogous provisions of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(e) (1976), the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79r(f) (1976), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1976).
In order to obtain an injunction under § 20(b), the SEC must demonstrate a "reasonable
likelihood" that the defendant will commit future violations. See SEC v. Management Dy-
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 53:373
tions for damages.4 In light of the recent Supreme Court decision in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,5 which established a requirement of
scienter in private actions brought under section 10(b) of the Secur-
ities Exchange Act of 1934, 7 a question has arisen concerning the
namics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d
1082, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1972). See generally 3 L. Loss, SEcUrIEs REGULATION 1976 (2d ed. 1961
& Supp. 1969); 7 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 64.04[1], at 65-40 to -41 (2d ed. 1974). Among
the factors that are considered in determining the likelihood of future violations are whether
the defendant's violation was an isolated act or a continuing practice; whether the defendant
asserts his innocence or adopts procedures to avoid future violations; whether defendant's
conduct was intentional, reckless or merely negligent; and whether an injunction will sub-
stantially harm the defendant. SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973). See
also SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100-01 (2d Cir. 1972) (proof of
intentional fraud is particularly relevant in determining the likelihood of future violations).
I See, e.g., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Globus v. Law
Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970); Odette
v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Crowell v. Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R.R., 373 F. Supp. 1303 (E.D. Pa. 1974). But see, e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman & Quail,
Inc., 561 F.2d 152 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, - U.S. - (1978); Gunter v. Hutcheson,
433 F. Supp. 42 (D.C. Ga. 1977) (no implied private damage action under § 17(a)). See also
3 L. Loss, SEcuRrnms REGULATION 1785-86 (2d ed. 1961); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Se-
curities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 181-82 (1933).
5 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
6 Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
(emphasis added). Section 10(b) and its regulatory cognate, Rule 10b-5, have been extremely
effective SEC weapons for the promotion of the securities acts' remedial and prophylactic
purposes. One commentator has noted that "SEC rule [10b-5 .'. . rose from obscurity to
the highest place in policing securities fraud. . . .Today no business deal involving securities
can safely be made without considering it." 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuirrms LAW: FRAUD § 1.1
(1977). V
1 425 U.S. at 193. Prior to Hochfelder, the courts and commentators were divided on the
question whether a cause for damages under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 required proof of scienter.
Compare Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007
(1975), Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc), and Kohn v.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286-88 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972) (scienter required), with White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th
Cir. 1974), and Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968) (scienter not required to establish liability). See also 6 L. Loss, SEcuRrrs REGULATION
3883-85 (2d ed. Supp. 1969); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32
U. Cm. L. Rav. 824, 839-44 (1965); Note, 82 HARv. L. REv. 938, 947 (1969).
In Hochfelder, a group of defrauded investors brought an action for damages against an
accounting firm, alleging that the firm had negligently aided and abetted violations of § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. 425 U.S. at 190. Virtually ignoring the aiding and abetting issue, Justice
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level of culpability which Congress intended to address in section
17(a).8 Recently, in SEC v. Coven,9 the Second Circuit concluded
that an injunction may be issued against an attorney whose negli-
gent conduct aided and abetted a violation of section 17(a).10
The defendant in Coven, an attorney specializing in securities
law, was retained by the president of Dennison Personnel, Inc. to
facilitate a public offering of its common stock." Under the terms
of the registration statement the first 3,000,000 shares were to be
sold on an "all-or-none" basis, with the proceeds to be returned to
the investors if the entire lot was not sold before the closing date.1 2
Although he was aware that the funds had not been handled in
accordance with the registration statement's terms and had no in-
formed basis for believing that the "all-or-none" requirement had
been met, Coven provided written assurances that the required
number of shares had been sold.' 3 After investigating several irregu-
Powell framed the question before the Court as "whether a private cause of action for dam-
ages will lie under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence on any allegation of 'scienter' -
intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud." Id. at 193 (footnote omitted). In resolving the
question, the Court reasoned that, since Congress had prescribed differing standards of liabil-
ity in the various sections of the securities laws dealing with civil remedies, the courts must
look primarily to the language of each section to ascertain the appropriate standard of liabil-
ity. Id. at 200. Turning to the specific language of § 10(b), the Court concluded that the
legislature's use of the words "manipulative or deceptive" in conjunction with "device or
contrivance" clearly indicated an intent to proscribe knowing or intentional misconduct. Id.
at 201-06.
' See note 32 infra.
9 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W. 3586 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1979) (No.
78-956).
, 581 F.2d at 1028.
" Id. at 1021.
" Id. at 1022. A total of 6,000,000 shares of Dennison common stock were to be sold at
$.10 a share. To ensure proper segregation of the proceeds from the sale of the first 3,000,000
shares, an escrow agreement was drafted requiring that all receipts be deposited immediately
in a special account with a list of purchasers and the number of shares purchased. The
agreement further provided that no disbursements were to be made until the entire 3,000,000
shares were sold. Id. This agreement was designed to bring the offering into compliance with
Rule 10b-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-9 (1978), which makes it a "manipulative or deceptive
device" to represent that an offering is to be sold on an "all-or-none" basis unless the consid-
eration paid is refunded if the specified number of shares are not sold within a designated
time.
" 581 F.2d at 1023. In direct violation of the terms of the escrow agreement, Carlton-
Cambridge & Co. (Carlton) and Stevens Jackson Seggos, Inc. (Stevens Jackson), the two
underwriters retained by Dennison to sell the offering, deducted their commissions before
depositing the proceeds from the sale of the "all-or-nothing" shares. Id. at 1022. In addition,
the underwriters failed to submit the required list of buyers. Id. On June 12, 1972, the parties
gathered at the office of the escrow agent for a closing of the all-or-none portion of the offering.
Although the escrow fund totalled only $262,496.75, Coven maintained that the closing was
proper since sufficient funds were available to pay Dennison its share of the proceeds from
the sale of the first 3,000,000 shares. The closing was aborted, however, when the escrow agent
refused to disburse the funds until it was given assurances that all 3,000,000 shares had been
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larities surrounding the offering, the SEC instituted a proceeding
against the appellant and eleven others to enjoin future violations. 4
The district court found that the securities laws had been violated
by the improper closing of the all-or-none portion of the offering, 5
the underwriters' failure to use best efforts to sell the entire issue,"
and the trading by one underwriter in the securities while a partici-
pant in their distribution." On the basis of his written assurances
and his failure to investigate certain of the underwriters' activities,
Coven was held liable for aiding and abetting violations of section
17(a) . 18
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in
part. 9 Judge Mansfield, who authored the unanimous panel opin-
sold. It was in response to this demand that Coven drafted a letter to the escrow agent stating
that 3,075,000 shares had been sold. Id. at 1023.
" Id. at 1021. The complaint alleged violations of §§ 5(b) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 15
U.S.C. 99 77e(b), 77q(a) (1976), § 10(b) and 15(c)(2) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b),
78u(c)(2) (1976), and Rules 10b-5, 10b-6, 10b-9 and 15c2-4 promulgated under the 1934 Act,
17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.10b-6, 240.10b-9, 240.15c2-4 (1978).
"1 581 F.2d at 1021. The court noted that Carlton failed to produce its records of sales
transactions from the all-or-none portion of the offering, id. at 1023 n.5, and had ordered
1,000,145 shares in its own "street name." The court concluded, therefore, that the entire lot
of 3,000,000 shares had not been sold before the closing and that Rule 10b-9 had been violated.
Id. at 1023.
1 Id. at 1021. The district court found that Carlton had terminated its efforts to sell the
Dennison stock well before the anticipated closing date. Id. at 1024. This cessation of solicita-
tions violated the terms of the registration statement, which required the underwriter to use
"best efforts" to sell the shares. Id. at 1022. A "best efforts" underwriting is to be contrasted
with a "firm commitment" underwriting in which the underwriter assumes the risk of loss
on the unsold portion of the distribution. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SEcURrrITS REGULATIONS
CASES AND MATERIALS 75 (3d ed. 1972). See also SECURrrms AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, SPECIAL
STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 494-95 (1963).
11 581 F.2d at 1025. Before the closing date, Carlton purchased 35,000 shares of Dennison
through a proxy from M.S. Wein, a trading house which Carlton had fraudulently induced
to "make a market" in Dennison stock. Id. at 1024. This conduct violated Rule 10b-6, 17
C.F.R. 240.10b-6 (1978), which makes it unlawful for an underwriter "to bid for or purchase
for any account in which he has beneficial interest" or "to attempt to induce any person to
purchase any such security or right, until after he has completed his participation in such
distribution."
" 581 F.2d at 1028. The district court found that Coven's letter to the escrow agent had
facilitated the improper release of escrow funds in violation of Rule 10b-9. Since a violation
of the specific provisions of Rule 10b-9 also constitutes an unlawful act under § 17(a), see
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F.2d 1082, 1097 (2d Cir. 1972), the court held that Coven
aided and abetted violations of both provisions. 581 F.2d at 1021. In addition, Coven was
found secondarily liable for Carlton's improper trading because he failed to make inquiries
despite his awareness that over-the-counter marketing activities had been initiated. Id. at
1024; see note 17 supra. Finally, the court held Coven liable for aiding and abetting the
underwriter's failure to use "best efforts," see note 16 supra, on the ground that he was
negligent in monitoring Carlton's sales efforts. 581 F.2d at 1024.
11 581 F.2d at 1021.
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ion, 2 rejected the appellant's contention that under the decision in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,21 liability could not be imposed in the
absence of a showing of scienter. - Noting that Coven involved an
SEC proceeding to enjoin violations of 17(a) of the 1933 Act while
Hochfelder was a private damages action brought under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act,2 the court concluded that the language2l and
legislative history25 of section 17(a) justified application of a negli-
The panel consisted of Judges Mansfield, Moore and Smith.
21 425 U.S. 185 (1976); see note 7 supra.
2 581 F.2d at 1026-27.
13 Id. at 1026. The Hochfelder Court expressly left open the question whether evidence
of scienter is required in SEC enforcement proceedings under § 10(b). 425 U.S. at 194 n.12.
Moreover, the Court stated that the standard governing actions arising under § 17(a) of the
1933 Act and other provisions of the securities laws must be determined by analyzing the
underlying legislative intent. Id. at 200. Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the
Hochfelder ruling was not determinative in Coven. 581 F.2d at 1026-27. It should be noted
that the Coven court found it unnecessary to resolve the question whether scienter is required
in § 10(b) injunctive suits, since it found the appellant culpable under § 17(a). 581 F.2d 1026
n.10 (citations omitted). At least one lower court, however, has determined that scienter is
the requisite standard of culpability in § 10(b) enforcement proceedings. See SEC v. Wills,
No. 77-0097 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978).
21 The Hochfelder Court based its decision on the language of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
which prohibits the use of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976); see 425 U.S. at 197.
Finding no comparable language in § 17(a), Judge Mansfield concluded that fraudulent
intent is not a necessary element of an enforcement action under the statute. 581 F.2d at 1026-
27. In support of this conclusion, Judge Mansfield observed that the language of § 17(a) is
virtually identical to that of Rule lOb-5, which the Hochfelder Court implied "could encom-
pass both intentional or negligent behavior," 425 U.S. at 212, if its scope were not limited by
the scienter requirement in the enabling statute, § 10(b). 581 F.2d at 1026.
Significantly, the Coven panel acknowledged that some courts have held that the §
17(a)(3) prohibition on any practice which "operates or would operate as a fraud" mandates
a showing of unlawful intent. Id. at 1026 n.11. Judge Mansfield, however, reasoned that
Congress used this language to "focus attention on the effect of potentially misleading con-
duct on the public, not on the culpability of the person responsible." Id. at 1026. (emphasis
in original) (footnote omitted). This interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's
construction of § 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976),
a provision almost identical to § 17(a)(3). SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180 (1963). The Capital Gains Court stated:
Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates "as a
fraud or deceit" upon a client, did not intend to require proof of intent to injure
and actual injury to the client. Congress intended the Investment Advisers Act of
1940 to be construed like other securities legislation "enacted for the purpose of
avoiding frauds," not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes.
Id. at 195 (footnote omitted); accord, SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044
(2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
" 581 F.2d at 1027. Judge Mansfield noted that an early version of § 17(a) passed by
the Senate, S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 13 (1933), required the SEC to prove willfulness
and intent to defraud to obtain an injunction. The House version, H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 8 (1933), however, did not contain such a requirement. In conference, the House
version was adopted and eventually became law. H.R. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 12
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gence standard in cases involving violations of that statute."
Additionally, Judge Mansfield held that, at least in the context
of SEC enforcement actions, the standard of culpability applicable
to direct violators of section 17(a) should be applied to those who
are charged with aiding and abetting violations. 27 In particular, the
Coven court reaffirmed its adherence to the test previously formu-
lated by the Second Circuit: whether the alleged aider and abettor
"should have been able to conclude that his act was likely to be used
in furtherance of illegal activity. ' 2 Applying this test to the facts
(1933). See generally Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171,
181-82 (1933).
26 581 F.2d at 1026-27.
2 Id. at 1028; accord, SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976).
Aiding and abetting liability was first established by the courts in the context of SEC injunc-
tive actions. See, e.g., SEC v. Scott Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); SEC v.
Schumaker, 83 F. Supp. 476 (E.D. Pa. 1947); SEC v. Time-trust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34 (N.D.
Cal. 1939). Later, a private cause of action for aiding and abetting violations of the securities
laws was recognized. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc);
Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971); Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968); Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), affl'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Pettit v.
American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). While the propriety of secondary
liability under the securities laws has not been seriously challenged in the courts, it should
be noted that the Supreme Court has expressly declined to address the issue. Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 192 n.7 (1976). For an in-depth discussion of aiding and abetting
liability, see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abet-
ting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. Rav. 597,
620-46 (1972). See generally Parker, Attorney Liability Under the Securities Laws after Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 10 Loy. oF L.A. L. Rav. 521 (1977); Sader, Professional Responsibi-
lity Under the Federal Securities Laws, 51 FrA. B.J. 198 (1977); Note, Rule 10b-5: Liability
for Aiding and Abetting After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 28 U. FLA. L. Rav. 999 (1976);
Note, 19 VmL. L. Rav. 932 (1974). Although the application of a negligence standard in SEC
enforcement proceedings against principal violators of the securities laws was well established
in the Second Circuit prior to 1973, see, e.g., SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424
F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 866-67 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the court's decision in SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d
535 (2d Cir. 1973), represented the first instance in which the rule was applied to secondary
parties. See Note, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 1860, 1864 (1974). Since Spectrum, the court has con-
tinued to articulate this standard for aiding and abetting securities frauds. See, e.g., SEC v.
Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics,
Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); accord, SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir.
1974); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 967 (1969); SEC v. M.A.
Lundy Assocs., 362 F. Supp. 226 (D.R.I. 1973); SEC v. Nat'l Bankers Life Ins. Co., 324 F.
Supp. 189 (N.D. Tex.), affl'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam). But see SEC v. Cof-
fey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975) (scienter required
to enjoin one who aids and abets violation of Rule 10b-5).
2' 581 F.2d at 1028; SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975)
(quoting SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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in Coven, Judge Mansfield concluded that the appellant's conduct
with respect to the improper closing of the all-or-none portion of the
offering aided and abetted those principally responsible for violating
section 17(a).29 The appellant's failure to investigate the underwri-
ters' activities, however, was deemed insufficient to establish liabil-
ity for aiding and abetting the improper trading and breach of duty
to use "best efforts," "[a]lthough the circumstances may well have
prompted a reasonable man to investigate . . 3
The Second Circuit traditionally has adhered to the view that
the SEC need not establish scienter in order to obtain an injunction
under the securities laws.31 Thus, its decision to permit the use of a
1 581 F.2d 1028. The Coven court also noted that the appellant's written assurances,
drafted after he was "on notice" that the entire all-or-none portion of the offering may not
actually have been sold, indicated "reckless disregard" sufficient to constitute scienter for
the purpose of establishing a violation of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 1029 (citing Rolf v. Blyth, East-
man Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1978)).
Id. at 1029.
' In SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193 (1963), discussed in
note 33 infra, the Supreme Court held that "[iut is not necessary in a suit for equitable or
prophylactic relief to establish all the elements required in a suit for monetary damages."
The Court reasoned:
To impose upon the Securities and Exchange Commission the burden of show-
ing deliberate dishonesty as a condition precedent to protecting investors through
the prophylaxis of disclosure would effectively nullify the protective purposes of the
statute.
375 U.S. at 200. This reasoning subsequently became the basis for the dual approach to
culpability announced in Judge Friendly's famous concurring opinion in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the Second Circuit, sitting en banc, held that an injunction was properly issued
against several parties who had been negligent in drafting a press release in violation of §
10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. 401 F.2d at 864. Judge Friendly concurred, but stated
that he would refuse to apply a negligence standard in private damages actions under § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 867 (Friendly, J., concurring). He justified application of a negligence
standard in SEC injunctive suits as follows:
In an enforcement proceeding for equitable or prophylactic relief the common law
standard of deceptive conduct has been modified in the interests of broader protec-
tion for the investing public so that negligent . . . conduct has become unlawful.
Id. at 854-55 (Friendly, J., concurring).
Judge Friendly's view that the elements of fraud should vary with the kind of relief
sought has been applied consistently by the Second Circuit. See SEC v. Universal Major
Indus. Corp*, 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d (2d Cir. 1976);
SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1974); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1304-05
(2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972);
Shemtob v. Shearson HammiUl & Co., 448 F.2d 442 (2d Cir. 1971); SEC v. Galaxy Foods,
Inc., 417 F. Supp. 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd mem., 556 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1976). Despite
the Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), see note 7
supra, the Second Circuit has appeared reluctant to abandon the negligence standard in SEC
enforcement suits under § 10(b). Although the court had the opportunity to review its position
in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977), aff'g on other grounds 420 F. Supp.
1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), it expressly declined to do so. 565 F.2d at 14. It should be noted that
the SEC has taken the position that a negligence standard should be applied uniformly in
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less demanding standard in Coven, a section 17(a) case, is not sur-
prising.32 Moreover, the decision seems sound in light of the prophy-
lactic policy implicit in the enforcement provisions of the securities
laws. 3 The precise contours of the standard applied in Coven, how-
all SEC proceedings for injunctive relief, without reference to the language of the particular
section under which the proceeding is brought. [19771 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 385,
at A-13 (Jan. 12, 1977).
2 Prior to the Hochfelder decision, the Seventh Circuit held that evidence of scienter or
fraudulent intent is not "essential in a suit for injunctive relief" under § 17(a)(2)-(3). SEC
v. Van Horn, 371 F.2d 181, 186 (7th Cir. 1966); accord, SEC v. Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284
(7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970). Since Hochfelder, the
federal courts have been divided on the question whether the scienter requirement is applica-
ble to SEC enforcement-actions brought under § 17(a). Compare SEC v. World Radio Mis-
sion, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 n.10 (1st Cir. 1976), SEC v. Southwest Coal & Energy Co., 439
F. Supp. 820, 826 (W.D. La. 1977), SEC v. Shiell, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,190 (N.D. Fla. 1977), and SEC v. Geotek, 426 F. Supp. 715, 726 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (scienter not required), with SEC v. Cenco, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 199-200 (N.D. Ill.
1977), and SEC v. American Realty Trust Co., 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va. 1977)
(scienter required). Illustrative of the approach taken by courts applying a negligence stan-
dard is SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976). In World Radio
Mission, the Commission initiated proceedings to enjoin a religious organization and its
leaders from committing further violations of § 17(a), § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the sale of
interest-bearing notes. As a defense, the appellants asserted their lack of deceptive intent.
Id. at 540. Reasoning that the language and legislative history of § 17(a) is significantly
different from that which the Hochfelder Court found dispositive, the First Circuit held that
§ 17(a) does not require scienter in an SEC action for remedial relief. Id. at 540-41.
In contrast, at least one court has held that, in view of the "similarity" in language and
purpose of § 17(a) and § 10(b), Hochfelder requires proof of scienter in SEC actions brought
under the former. See SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 (E.D. Va.
1977). In dismissing an injunctive action brought against a real estate trust which had negli-
gently omitted information in a document subject to SEC regulation the American Realty
court reasoned:
If the language and history of 10(b) is dispositive as to a scienter requirement
in private actions, it must also be so for SEC enforcement actions since such suits
are creatures of statute rather than implied rights of action.
Id. at 1171.
" See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808 (2d Cir. 1975) wherein the
court stated:
[Tihe SEC appears in these [injunctive] proceedings . . . as a statutory guardian
charged with safeguarding the public interest in enforcing the securities laws.
Hence, by making the showing required by statute that the defendant "is engaged
or about to engage" in illegal acts, the Commission is seeking to protect the public
interest ....
Id.
The courts generally have drawn a clear distinction between the prophylactic effects of
enforcement actions and the compensatory purposes of private damages suits. E.g., List v.
Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); see Painter,
Inside Information: Growing Pains for the Development of Federal Corporation Law Under
Rule Iob-5, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1361 (1965). Thus, a strong argument may be made that the
Hochfelder rationale is not applicable to enforcement suits under the securities law. It also
has been argued that the Hochfelder decision is illustrative of a trend in recent Supreme
Court decisions to limit the availability of private actions for damages. SEC Gen. Counsels
Memorandum Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP.
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ever, are somewhat unclear. Although the court stated that negli-
gent conduct is enough to establish an aiding and abetting violation,
it expressly declined to find liability where an attorney failed to
make inquiries in the face of circumstances sufficient to place a
reasonable man on notice that irregularities might be present. 5
Significantly, despite the Second Circuit's professed adherence to a
negligence standard," since Hochfelder it has not actually upheld
an injunction against a secondarily liable defendant in the absence
of an alternative finding of "recklessness. ' 3
It is submitted that such results are inevitable under the Sec-
ond Circuit's articulated test for "negligent" aiding and abetting
liability. A requirement that the defendant knew or should have
known that his conduct "was likely to be used in furtherance of
illegal activity"3 seems calculated to exclude from liability all but
those who deliberately close their eyes to palpable illegalities in
wanton disregard of the truth and of their role in advancing the
illegal scheme. Yet, it is clear that such individuals may be enjoined
under the Second Circuit's scienter standard39 without having to
(BNA) No. 354, at F-2 to -3 (May 26, 1976) (citing Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S.
49 (1975); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975)). See also Santa Fe
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), rev'g 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976).
' One commentator has noted that the Second Circuit's decision in Coven makes it
difficult to predict whether a district court will issue an injunction when an attorney is
charged with secondary liability. Brodsky, Attorney's Liability as Aider and Abettor in SEC
Injunction Actions, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
= See note 30 and accompanying text supra.
' See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976); see Berdahl v.
SEC, 572 F.2d 643, 647 n.6 (2d Cir. 1978).
33 SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); see SEC v. Universal Major
Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1046 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515
F.2d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1975).
3' Since Hochfelder, the Second Circuit has held that recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement in § 10(b) actions. Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44-48 (2d
Cir. 1978); accord, Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 792 (7th Cir. 1977); Sund-
strand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
875 (1978). But see SEC v. American Realty Trust, 429 F. Supp. 1148, 1171 & n.7 (E.D. Va.
1977) (recklessness does not satisfy Hochfelder). The Second Circuit's holding in Rolf is
consistent with its pre-Hochfelder determinations. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d
1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc); Shemtob v. Shearson Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445
(2d Cir. 1971).
When the courts began to recognize a civil damage action for aiding and abetting, see
cases cited in note 27 supra, they looked to the law of torts for guidance in establishing the
elements of a cause of action. RwrTAEmmrr OF ToRS § 876 (1939) provides:
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, a
person is liable if he
(a) orders or induces such conduct, knowing of the conditions under which
the act is done or intending the consequences which ensue, or
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resort to a less demanding negligence theory.
The problem underlying the Second Circuit's test may lie in its
emphasis on the issue of the defendant's mental state and its con-
comitant neglect of another critical element of aiding and abetting
liability: the requirement that the defendant actually "give sub-
stantial assistance to the [primary wrongdoer] in accomplishing"
the illegal result. 0 An analysis of the facts in Coven in light of this
variable could have led the court to similar conclusions without the
need to make fine distinctions concerning the defendant's mental
state. Clearly, a defendant who fails to investigate suspicious cir-
cumstances and consequently is not in a position to expose a securi-
ties fraud cannot be said to have materially furthered the illegal-
ity. 4' On the other hand, when an attorney furnishes a false or mis-
leading statement which induces innocent parties to act, he may be
deemed to have rendered substantial assistance to the fraud.
Although the Coven court's negligence test appears to reach
only reckless conduct, it is submitted that, where the defendant has
provided affirmative assistance to the primary wrongdoer, mere
negligence will be deemed sufficient to establish liability.4 2 Where,
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives
substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result
and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty to a third
person.
The Restatement formula has been utilized by several circuit courts. E.g., Rochez Bros.,
Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315-18 (6th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co.,
417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1969); H.L. Federman & Co. v.
Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The courts' interpretation of subsections
(b) and (c), however, has not been uniform. See 3 L. Loss, SEcuRmEs REGULATION 1432 (2d
ed. 1961). See generally Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace
the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1206 (1970).
4' RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 876(c) (1939).
' In interpreting the "substantial assistance" element, the courts have differed on the
question whether mere silence or inaction is sufficient to impose liability. Compare Kerbs v.
Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974), and Brennan v. Midwestern United
Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1969), with Landy v.
FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974), and Wessel v.
Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 383 (9th Cir. 1971).
42 See SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1028-29 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 47 U.S.L.W.
3586 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1979) (No. 78-956); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044,
1047 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 811 (2d Cir. 1975);
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973). In Spectrum, Judge Kaufman
stated:
We do not believe. . . that imposition of a negligence standard with respect to the
conduct of a secondary participant is overly strict. . . .The legal profession plays
a unique and pivotal rule in the effective implementation of the securities laws
... . [Tihe smooth functioning of the securities markets will be seriously dis-
turbed if the public cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an attorney when he
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however, all that is established is a mere failure to investigate,
evidence of recklessness would seem to be required." While the
Second Circuit has never expressly differentiated between active
and passive conduct, such a distinction may be useful in evaluating
aiding and abetting cases.
John R. Calcagni
renders an opinion on such matters.
Id. at 541-42.
1 In Coven, the court stated:
Absent some concrete indication of knowledge by appellant that an underwriter was
engaged in wrongful trading, we do not think that as attorney for the issuer he was
under an obligation to investigate ....
581 F.2d at 1030 (emphasis added).
